If the Marine Corps needs naval surface fires support, it's time to bring back the battleship. -- By William L. Stearman
Our defense establishment, from top on down, seems increasingly convinced that our future wars will be much like Afghanistan and Iraq, requiring no forcible entry from the sea (FEFS) capability. However, an excellent article in the November 2004 Proceedings, entitled "Forcible Entry Is a Strategic Necessity," by LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR(Ret), convincingly counters this view. It states what should be obvious to all: we cannot always count on the cooperation of friendly governments in future operations, and "[we] must be able to enter any theater during crises." It also notes that FEFS operations "present a range of dynamics and dilemmas to adversaries" and cause them to expend resources on defending a large area. FEFS, however, requires effective naval surface fire support (NSFS).
Background
As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) earlier (18 May 2001) pointed out, the Navy was (and still is) generally ill-equipped for littoral operations. Most recently (19 November 2004), GAO focused on the deficiency that would most seriously affect Marines in future littoral conflicts-the absence of any effective NSFS. The Navy has persisted in focusing on 5-inch guns-especially the costly, ill-fated extended range guided munitions-after the Marines had made clear that 5-inch guns will not meet their lethality and volume of fire requirements, even should they meet their range requirements. On 1 April 2003, Gen Michael W. Hagee strongly implied this viewpoint when he testified that "our Nation's expeditionary forces will remain at considerable risk" for want of NSFS until the DD(X) destroyer with its two 155mm guns joins the fleet "in significant numbers." Since the DD(X) buy is now down to 6 ships (from 24) and may well end up as merely a research and development project, this goal is not likely ever to be achieved, leaving Marines high and dry unless the battleships USS Iowa (BB 61) and USS Wisconsin (BB 64) are readied for rapid reactivation. The need for this solution can best be dramatized in the following scenarios. These scenarios are options for coping with FEFS in case of another, quite plausible, Korean conflict.
Situation
It is 2008. U.S. troops were withdrawn from the Republic of South Korea (ROSK) in 2006 at the latter's request. North Korea subsequently greatly increased its presence there. (It already had a presence of 10,000 agents in 2005.) Its agents are used to foment widespread unrest and demonstrations among the minority of conservative Koreans who oppose their leftist government. North Korean dictator Kirn Jong Il then announces that he has been asked "to restore order" in the ROSK and to that end is sending in "volunteers." These volunteers, all members of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), stream across the now undefended former demilitarized zone (DMZ). ROSK Armed Forces have been largely relocated to former U.S. bases at Osan and Pusan to the south. With the ROSK Government "in protective custody," ROSK generals appeal to the United States and Japan to help them evict the North Koreans.
Kim Jong Il has calculated that a "no more Iraqs" syndrome in the United States, plus the upcoming Presidential election, will inhibit it from interfering. Moreover, Kim is assured that China will not intervene. However, faced with a potentially disastrous weakening of the U.S. position in Asia should we let this invasion stand, the President, with very narrow backing from Congress, announces that we will intervene. We have, meanwhile, surged seven carrier task forces and eight Navy/Marine expeditionary task groups (ETGs) to Japan, and B-52 and B-2 bombers to Guam. Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) are readied for deployment. We remain weak, however, in mine warfare and littoral antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and essentially bereft of NSFS. Japan, with the world's second largest Navy, agrees to provide the necessary mine warfare and ASW assets, but themselves have no effective NSFS.
First Scenario: No Battleships
We launch a massive "shock and awe" air assault on the North and on its forces in the South. Numerous strikes by improved Tomahawk missiles, carrier air, and U.S. Air Force (USAF) assets, including B-52s and B-2s, attack key static strategic and operational targets, with initial emphasis on enemy air and antiair assets, naval installations, nuclear installations, and missile sites. Hardened military support installations north of the DMZ are being attacked with 5,000-pound bombs, the only weapons on hand that can take out the hardened military targets in the North.
To tie down troops in the North, we immediately leak disinformation that we intend to implement a longstanding strategic concept of cutting North Korea in half at its narrow neck, which would also entail the capture of the capital, Pyongyang, in the west. Four ETGs appear off Wonson-the eastern point in the neck-in a feint emulating the highly successful Marine Corps feint during the 1991 Gulf War; however, the 1991 feint was made credible by the presence of the battleships USS Missouri (BB 63) and Wisconsin, which demonstrated an ability to rearrange the topography. Now, the obvious absence of any NSFS capability robs this feint of any credibility and foredooms it.
Four more ETGs, in the meantime, move around to the west of the ROSK to effect a landing in the less mountainous western part of the country, better suited for subsequent armor and other motorized operations and offering the best approach to taking back Seoul. The idea is to link up with ROSK Army units moving south from Osan and northwest from Pusan. A landing beach is selected just south of Kunsan that is close to a highway essential to any breakout from the beachhead. Because this landing beach is such an obvious choice, the NKPA chooses to defend it with infantry and towed and self-propelled artillery, all well dug in.
Unfortunately, there is little chance of timely and effective air support because of bad weather and substantial distance from carriers, all remaining in the northeastern part of the Sea of Japan after a successful antiship missile attack on one of them. USAF tactical aircraft are in Japan, and the bombers are in Guam. The ETG's DDG destroyers have one 5-inch gun each with only a 13-nautical-mile (15-mile) range. Extended range 5-inch programs have been scrubbed. As Deputy secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz once cogently noted, a 5-inch round that goes 100 miles is still a 5-inch round when it arrives. Two DDGs move to within 12 miles of the landing beach and ineffectively fire upon the entrenched NKPA troops. Both take hits from 170mm guns and are knocked out of commission, having to limp back to Japan under escort. There are some precision guided munitions airstrikes, delivered from 15,000 feet because of the ever-present surface-to-air missile threat. These do relatively little damage. A B-52 strike is then called in. As was often the case in Vietnam, the enemy is alerted to this pending strike and withdraws its forces from the immediate area. After the strike is over, they quickly return. The U.S. officer in overall command opts to seize this moment to launch a landing. A sizable number of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) (expeditionary fighting vehicles are not yet fielded) with troops head for the beach, departing from about 25 miles out. Alerted, the extensive enemy artillery waits for just the right moment and then opens up on the AAVs with devastating results. Those Marines who reach the beach are cut down before they can establish a defensive perimeter. DDGs cannot provide NSFS because their 5-inch guns prove totally ineffective, and they risk being sunk by enemy artillery. To avoid further losses the officer in command is ordered to terminate the operation, and the four ETGs, plus four more that have just arrived from off Wonson, all hastily depart. Marines have not incurred such heavy single battle losses since Vietnam. These casualties create an enormously negative reaction in the United States, and all further attempts at forcible entry are abandoned. Without "boots on the ground" the North Koreans can be pummeled from the air, but cannot be evicted from the ROSK.
Second Scenario: With Iowa and Wisconsin
Wisconsin's surface action group (SAG), plus four ETGs, make the feint off Wonson credible and tie down a number of enemy troops. Since over half of the enemy military installations, most well-hardened, are within minimum 16-inch range, Wisconsin's heavy projectiles (some over one ton) can take out most of these installations. With 40-plus-mile 13inch 1,365-pound EX 148 guided projectiles and 100-plus-mile 11-inch extended range guided sabot rounds, Wisconsin takes out a large number of targets in the area.
The landing at Kurisan includes four ETGs supported by Iowa's SAG. A number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) spot enemy artillery, and Iowa, from 35 miles offshore, opens up on them with EX 148s with great success. Iowa then moves to within 20 miles of the beach and pulverizes enemy troop entrenchments. She then comes to within 10 miles to draw enemy artillery fire, sustaining some hits that do little damage, but using FireFinder radar and UAVs, she is able to silence remaining artillery pieces. Marines come ashore in AAVs to discover the surviving enemy troops in a state of shock. The Marines quickly establish a defensive perimeter that is rapidly reinforced by troops brought in by MV-22 Ospreys.
An aggressive Marine Corps reconnaissance patrol and UAVs spot an approaching enemy column consisting of 10 T-62 tanks and a large number of armored personnel carriers that have been summoned to reinforce the highly threatened NKPA troops at Kunsan. Repeated salvos of 1,900-pound guided (with guidance integrated fuses) 16-inch rounds rain down on this column totally neutralizing it. More Marines come ashore and are reinforced by Army BCTs. Ospreys fly some troops down to the ROSK column moving northwest from Pusan for a linkup. We have boots on the ground, and we are prepared to see it through.
Implications
Here we have a realistic example of how battleships can still save Marines' lives. According to former Commandant Gen Leonard F. Chapman, the USS New Jersey (BB 62), in only 6 months on the gun line off Vietnam, "saved thousands of American lives." Groundless antibattleship animus in the Navy was responsible for such a limited deployment. If a battleship could save thousands of American lives in only 6 months, how many could it have saved had one been on the gun line all 7-plus years we fought there? Also, we lost 1,067 aircraft attacking targets in North Vietnam; 80 percent of those targets could have easily been taken out with 16-inch guns. With extended range rounds, successfully tested in 1968, 16-inch guns could have reached nearly all targets in North Vietnam.
Now returning to the 19 November 2004 GAO report cited above, the most interesting part is that the:
Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supports the Navy's modernization efforts to a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa battleships.
This statement followed a list of reasons the Navy gave for not reactivating the battleships. The other novel part of the report is the admission that, in effect, only battleships can now, and in the next term, meet Marine Corps range requirements. (Of course, they can meet Marines' lethality and volume of fire requirements in spades.)
This is the first time in over 10 years that the Marine Corps has come out openly supporting battleship reactivation; although probattleship sentiment has long remained strong in the Corps. For example, on 5 October 1998, then-LtGen James L. Jones wrote: "I am glad to lend my interest and support for US naval fire support, of which battleships are one option." (He also made probattleship statements as Commandant.) The task now is overcoming Navy opposition to readying Iowa and Wisconsin for rapid reactivation in time of need, which could be at almost any time. Marines and soldiers simply cannot continue to, in Gen Hagee's words, "remain at considerable risk" for want of adequate NSFS. All of the Navy's reasons for opposing battleships (e.g., too costly in dollars and manpower, obsolete, unneeded) can be easily rebutted. Too much is now at stake to continue heeding these groundless arguments.
. . . only battleships can now, and in the next term, meet Marine Corps range requirements.
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